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Abstract
Our object recognition abilities, a direct product of our experience with objects, are fine-tuned to perfection. Left temporal
and lateral areas along the dorsal, action related stream, as well as left infero-temporal areas along the ventral, object
related stream are engaged in object recognition. Here we show that expertise modulates the activity of dorsal areas in the
recognition of man-made objects with clearly specified functions. Expert chess players were faster than chess novices in
identifying chess objects and their functional relations. Experts’ advantage was domain-specific as there were no differences
between groups in a control task featuring geometrical shapes. The pattern of eye movements supported the notion that
experts’ extensive knowledge about domain objects and their functions enabled superior recognition even when experts
were not directly fixating the objects of interest. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) related exclusively the areas
along the dorsal stream to chess specific object recognition. Besides the commonly involved left temporal and parietal
lateral brain areas, we found that only in experts homologous areas on the right hemisphere were also engaged in chess
specific object recognition. Based on these results, we discuss whether skilled object recognition does not only involve a
more efficient version of the processes found in non-skilled recognition, but also qualitatively different cognitive processes
which engage additional brain areas.
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Introduction
Our object recognition abilities, a direct product of our
experience with objects, are fine-tuned to perfection – we need
just a split of a second to recognize an everyday object and its
function [1]. A dedicated network of left lateralized areas along the
ventral and dorsal visual streams has been associated with this
amazing feat [2–3]. It is less clear, however, whether and how this
network enables particularly skilled recognition as found among
experts who have extensive experience with domain-specific
objects and their functions. Here we show that skilled recognition
of chess objects and their functions does not exclusively involve the
left lateral areas usually related to normal object recognition.
Instead, skilled recognition of chess objects and their functions
additionally engage the homologous right regions.
Everyday objects have typical forms that make them recogniz-
able. The ventral visual stream, thought to be essential in object
recognition, carries information from the occipital primary visual
areas to the inferior-temporal cortex [4–5]. A part of the inferior
temporal cortex, fusiform gyrus (FG), is thought to mediate the
perception of color and form [6–7]. The medial part of the left FG
participates in everyday object recognition [8–9]. Everyday
objects, however, have also characteristic functions. This is
particularly the case with man-made manipulable objects such
as saw or hammer, whose visual features are directly related to
their function. These functions are closely coupled to actions
which are inevitably associated with movements. The dorsal visual
stream is thought to mediate spatially related action [4–5]. For
example, the posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) at the left
lateral side is activated when people name visually or acoustically
presented everyday objects, and particularly when they have to
retrieve their function [6,10–11]. An explicit retrieval of actions
associated with an object is closely associated with the supramar-
ginal gyrus (SMG) in the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL; [3]). The
SMG is activated when people are explicitly instructed to retrieve
a function-related action with an object [12–13] and its activation
is particularly modulated by actual execution of an action [14–15].
Both, the ventral and the dorsal pathway are more activated in
the left than right hemisphere in recognition of manmade objects.
This left lateralization probably enables anatomical projections
between the object-related brain regions in the left hemisphere
[16–19].
Although separate characteristics of objects such as form and
function engage separate visual streams, recognition of form and
function are nevertheless inextricably connected [9]. This reflects
our real life experience with objects that are often impossible to
recognize without identifying their particular functions. The
intrinsic coupling between objects’ external features and their
functions, as a reflection of our experience with them, has long
been recognised in neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience
[10,20–21]. Indeed, a training study of novel objects and their
functions [22] indicates that the left lateral (pMTG, SMG/IPL)
and left ventral (medial FG) areas mediate recognition of trained
artificial objects and their functions.
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the impact of prior experience on recognition of objects and their
functions, the amount of training in experimental studies is
typically limited to a few hours, or in the best case, a few days of
training. Yet, in real life, we are exposed to everyday objects for
years. From an experimental point of view, it is difficult to measure
our experience with objects, and in most cases, we all are familiar
with common everyday objects to a similar extent. Here we used
the game of chess to circumvent these problems. We employed the
expertise approach [23–24] to investigate learning related
differences in recognition of objects and their functions by
comparing expert and novice chess players.
Although chess is a complex cognitive activity that needs years
to master [25–30], it rests on the recognition of chess specific
objects, called pieces, and their functions [31–32]. Chess objects
are manipulable manmade objects because they have typical forms
and shapes that makes them recognizable. The form of a chess
object is not directly related to its function but the form and
function are firmly coupled through chess rules (e.g., how certain
pieces move). The functions are in turn inextricably linked to
actions, that is, movements associated with chess objects (e.g.,
executing a move).
Most importantly, the game of chess enables us to compare
chess experts, who possess extensive experience and knowledge
about chess objects and their relations, with chess novices, who are
superficially familiar with the game of chess and its objects. This
expertise approach features falsification in the experimental design
[33–35] and thus should provide insight in the neural mechanism
behind object recognition. Of particular interest is to see how the
well-known object recognition network mediates experts’ chess
specific recognition in comparison to that of novices. Skilled
recognition may, for example, engage the same left lateral areas
known to be engaged in non-skilled recognition. The same areas
would, however, work more or less in terms of increased or
decreased neural firing rates to accommodate experience based
differences between skilled and non-skilled recognition. In this
case, we would assume that skilled recognition involves qualita-
tively similar processes as non-skilled recognition. The difference
would be of a quantitative nature [23,36–37]. Alternatively, the
processes of skilled recognition may involve additional areas in the
same, or even in the other, hemisphere to meet processing
demands. In this case, we would assume that skilled recognition is
not only a more efficient version of non-skilled recognition, but
that it also involves qualitatively different processes.
We investigated the recognition processes of 1) neutral
geometrical shapes (Control task), 2) chess objects (Identity task)
and 3) functions of chess objects (Check task – see Figure 1A for all
three tasks) in expert and novice chess players using behavioral
(reaction time and eye movement recordings) and neuroimaging
techniques. The Control task involved recognition of geometrical
objects because it is reasonable to assume that both expert and
novice chess players have the same degree of expertise (most likely
rather limited expertise) with geometrical shapes. In contrast, the
Identity task required the domain-specific object recognition
which should favour experts who possess knowledge about chess
pieces (e.g., form, function). Comparing the Identity with Control
task will thus enable us to pinpoint behavioral and neural
mechanism underlying chess-specific object recognition. The
Check task involved object recognition similarly as the Identity
task because it is necessary to recognize the chess piece to
determine whether it is checking the king. The Check task also
required an additional component related to the function of the
identified object, that is, the possible moves of this certain piece.
The comparison between Check and Control tasks should identify
not only object recognition, but also its coupling with the explicit
retrieval of objects’ functions. The retrieval of function and the
process of relating two objects will be identified by comparing
Check with Identity task. Finally, the comparison between experts
and novices on the chess-specific tasks enabled us to identify the




Average time in second needed to identify geometrical shapes
(Control task), chess objects (Identity task), and check relations of
chess pieces (Check task) are shown in Figure 1C for averages over
the whole experiment. Given there were learning effects in the
task, we were also interested in the performance at the beginning
of the experiment. Figure 1D presents the averages over the first
run.
Chess specific object recognition (Identity vs
Control). The TASK (Control-Identity) 6 EXPERTISE
(Experts-Novices) ANOVA showed that both groups of players
needed more time to identify geometrical shapes than chess pieces
(main effect task – F(1, 14)=53, p,.01). This may be surprising
but one must consider the fact that people actually have very
limited experience with geometrical shapes. On the other hand,
even our novices have probably more often encountered chess
pieces than geometrical shapes. The expertise effect (F(1, 14)=.8)
and the interaction (F(1, 14)=.3) were not significant. Although
there are descriptive differences between experts and novices in
the Identity task, the differences did not reach the significance level
(t(14)=1.2, p=.26; Control task – t(14)=.2, ns.). The reasons for
the lack of an expertise effect on the Identity task is most likely a
ceiling effect – novices improved their performance over time,
while experts were already at the very limits of fast recognition at
the beginning of the experiment in the first run (see Figure 1D). To
consider untrained task performance we computed the same
ANOVA for data of the first run only. The Control task required
more time than the Identity task (main effect task – F(1, 14)=28.1,
p,.01). The expertise effect (F(1, 14)=.2) and interaction (F(1,
14)=2.1) were not significant, but single comparisons revealed
that experts were significantly faster than novices on the Identity
task (t-test for independent groups on the Identity task – t(14)=2.2,
p,.05; Control task – t(14)=.6, ns).
Chess specific recognition of objects and their functions
(Check vs Control). The time needed to complete the Check
and Control task was not significantly different among both groups
(main effect of task – F(1, 14)=.3), just like any group was not
significantly faster over both tasks (main effect of expertise – F(1,
14)=3.1). Experts were, however, much faster than novices on the
Check task, while there were no differences on the Control task
(task x expertise interaction – F(1, 14)=29.6, p,.01; t-test for
independent groups on the Check task – t(14)=2.4, p,.05). The
same pattern of results was obtained when the first run was
separately analyzed (task x expertise interaction – F(1, 14)=10.7,
p,.01; t-test for independent groups on the Check task –
t(14)=2.5, p,.05; main effect task – F(1, 14)=.2, ns; main effect
expertise – F(1, 14)=.6, ns).
Chess specific recognition of functions (Check vs
Identity). Finally, the Check task was more demanding than the
Identity task as indicated by increased RTs for the Check task (main
effect task – F(1, 14)=91.7, p,.01). The difference between experts
and novices was more pronounced on the Check task than on the
Identity (task x expertise interaction – F(1, 14)=7.5, p,.05). The
main effect of expertise did not reach significance (F(1, 14)=3,
Skilled Recognition of Objects and Their Functions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e16202p=.10), because of the small differences in the Identity task whereas
experts’ and novices’ performance differed in the Check task. As
mentioned above, we attribute the lack of the significant expertise
effect to a ceiling effect. In the first run, that is without training on the
tasks, the reaction times were increased in the Check task compared
to the Identity task (main effect task – F(1, 14)=49.5, p,.01), and
experts were faster overall (main effect expertise – F(1, 14)=6, p,.
05). There was no significant interaction (F(1, 14)=.3, ns.).
The superiority of experts on the chess specific tasks is not a
product of their disregard for accuracy. If anything, experts made
fewer mistakes in the chess related tasks (see File S1).
Eye Movement Data
Experts were faster in domain specific recognition of objects and
their functions, but the advantage is not driven by their superior
general recognition (there were no differences in the Control task).
This pattern of results points to a highly efficient and domain
specific mechanism underlying experts’ superior recognition of
objects and their relations. Eye movements will further elaborate
and shed light on the nature of the mechanism [23,38–39]. We
were particularly interested in the pattern of fixations (i.e.
percentages of fixation on objects of interest). The number of
fixations followed the behavioural analysis (see File S1).
Figure 2A shows that experts and novices did not only differ
regarding the number of fixations for the three tasks, but also on
the pattern of fixations. When the stimuli were not chess specific in
the Control task, the eye movements of experts and novices were
similar (Figure 2A, left panel). In contrast, in the Identity task
novices fixated more often directly at the chess piece they needed
to recognize, while experts fixated beside the pieces and at the
centre of the board (Figure 2A, middle panel). The differences
were also evident in the Check task (Figure 2A, right panel) as
novices needed to attend to both pieces to make sure that the
function of the chess objects forms the check relation. The pattern
of fixations in experts remained the same as in the Identity task –
they fixated mostly at the centre of the board.
Chess specific object recognition (Identity vs
Control). We calculated the percentage of fixations that fell
on the squares with objects of interest (pieces needed to complete
the tasks) to statistically confirm these observations. Figure 2B
Figure 1. Stimuli and behavioural data. (A) Tasks: Control task required to identify geometrical shapes (square or diamond), Identity task to
indicate whether the presented piece is a rook or a knight, and Check task to indicate whether the black piece (knight or rook) gives the white king
check. The four different stimulus exemplars in each condition are presented (see Methods for explanation). (B) Diagram depicting the trial structure.
Each block started with an empty 363 board, presented for 13.5 s, which acted as a baseline. The baseline was followed by an instruction/task cue for
3 s indicating the required task. After the instruction, an empty 363 board appeared for 1 s and served as break. Then a black fixation cross appeared
in the middle of the 363 board. The cross lasted for 0.5 s and was used to inform players about the upcoming stimulus. The target stimulus lasted
until response or maximally for 2 s. Independent on response times, the next trial started 2 s after stimulus onset with the presentation of the 1 s
break and the fixation cross. There were 4 trials in a block and after each block the baseline was presented. (C) Reaction time (RT; in seconds)
averaged for experts and novices in the Control, Identity, and Check tasks over all runs (whole session). (D) Reaction time averaged for experts and
novices in the Control, Identity, and Check tasks in the first run (first quarter of the session). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM).
*p,.05 in a two tailed t-test for independent samples (experts versus novices).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016202.g001
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the objects of interest in the Control task than in the Identity task
(main effect task – F(1, 9)=4.6, p=.06). This was mostly related to
the performance of experts on the Identity task as they fixated
considerably less often directly on the objects of interests. Although
neither the main effect of expertise (F(1, 9)=3.4) nor its interaction
with tasks (F(1, 9)=2.7) were statistically significant, experts fixated
less often directly on objects of interest than novices on the Identity
task (t(9)=2.4, p,.05; Control task – t(9)=.5, ns.).
Chess specific recognition of objects and their relations
(Check vs Control). Similar results were obtained when we
compared Check and Control tasks. Fewer direct fixations were
found on the Check task, but mainly because of the performance of
experts on the Check task. The main effects of expertise (F(1, 9)=3.2,
p=.11) and task (F(1, 9)=.6, ns.) were not significant just like their
interaction (F(1, 9)=3.1, p=.11). Experts fixated less often directly
than novices at the objects in the Check task (t(9)=2.6, p,.05).
Chess specific recognition of functions (Check vs
Identity). In both chess tasks novices fixated objects of interest
more often directly than experts (main effect expertise – F(1,
9)=7.4, p,.05). The main effect of task (F(1, 9)=1.3) and
interaction (F(1, 9)=.2) were not significant.
Neuroimaging Data
Eye movement analysis showed that expert players do not
directly focus at the chess objects to identify them unlike novices
who directly fixated on the chess objects to perform the chess tasks.
The neuroimaging data will provide the neural mechanism behind
experts’ superior recognition of objects and their functions.
Chess specific object recognition (Identity vs Con-
trol). The direct comparison of Identity and Control task will
provide information regarding the neural basis of chess specific
object recognition (main effect of task). We were also interested in
the areas that showed different sensitivity for experts and novices in
the Identity but not in the Control task (task x expertise interaction).
Figure 3A shows that the left lateral areas such as pMTG and the
neighbouring occipito-temporal junction (OTJ) were significantly
more activatedintheIdentity than inthe Controltask.Besides these
left lateral areas, the right OTJ junction was also more activated in
the Identity task. There were no significant areas for the tasks x
expertise interaction at the corrected threshold. When we slightly
lowered thethresholdtop,.00001(uncorrected),wefoundtheright
OTJ activated (right side of Figure 3A). All other areas, including
the inferior temporal lobe associated with recognition of color and
shape, revealed no significant activation related to chess specific
object recognition. There were also no significant effects of
expertise. This is not surprising because the comparison (main
effect of expertise) involves a neutral control task for which there
should be no differences.
Chess specific recognition of objects and their functions
(Check vs Control). We further compared the Check and
Control tasks to identify brain areas associated with not only
Figure 2. Eye movement data. (A) All fixations of experts (blue dots) and novices (red dots) on an example stimulus in the Control (left), Identity
(middle), and Check (right) task. (B) Average percentage of fixation that falls on objects of interests in a trail in experts and novices in the Control,
Identity, and Check tasks averaged across all runs. Error bars indicate SEM. * p ,.05 and {p ,.10 in a two tailed t-test for independent samples
(experts versus novices).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016202.g002
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them. The comparison between Check and Control tasks (main
effect task) revealed significant activations in the areas as in the
previous comparison – left lateral areas (pMTG & OTJ) and right
OTJ (Figure 3B). Additional brain areas were also activated –
supramarginal gyrus (SMG) at the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) at
the left hemisphere, and pMTG, parieto-occipito-temporal
junction (POTJ), and SMG at the right hemisphere. The task x
expertise interaction revealed activation only in the right lateral
areas and the left SMG (right side of Figure 3B). Again, experts
and novices did not reveal differently activated brain regions
across both tasks, which is not surprising given that the differences
were not expected in the Control task.
Chess specific recognition of functions (Check vs
Identity). To elaborate which areas are exclusively related to
the recognition of relations between objects we compared the
Check and Identity tasks. There were no areas that differentiated
between the two tasks (Figure 3C) and no areas were sensitive to
the interaction between tasks and expertise. When we lowered the
threshold to p,.00001 (uncorrected), the left SMG was active
(right side of Figure 3C). In both tasks experts engaged more the
right OTJ than novices (main effect of expertise).
Comparing the fMRI data of players on the chess tasks (Check
and Identity) and the Control task we found a network of brain
areas responsible for the recognition of chess objects and their
functions. Figure 4 summarizes the findings and plots activation
levels in the first run in these areas. While this confirms the whole
brain analysis, it additionally provides an overview of the results
[40]. Just like the recognition of other manipulable man-made
everyday objects with clearly specified functions [3], recognition of
chess objects and their functions was left lateralized. The left
tempo-lateral areas were more activated in the Check and Identity
tasks than in the Control task. Chess recognition, however, also
engaged additional right lateral areas, but only in experts. The
Figure 3. Neuroimagining data. (A) The network of brain areas activated in recognition of chess object across all runs (whole session) – contrast
Identity vs Control task (left side) and its interaction with expertise (right side). (B) The network of brain areas activated in recognition of chess object
and their functions across all runs (whole session) – contrast Check vs Control task (left side) and its interaction with expertise (right side). (C) The
network of brain areas activated in recognition of object functions across all runs (whole session) – contrast Check vs Identity task (left side) and its
interaction with expertise (right side). The comparisons were based on p,.05 (corrected) and clusters of 5 or more voxels. The interaction between
task and expertise in (A) and (C) were based on a lower threshold of p,.00001 (uncorrected). The significant areas included bilateral posterior middle
temporal gyrus (pMTG), bilateral occipito-temporal junction (OTJ), right parieto-occipito-temporal junction (POTJ), and bilateral supramarginal gyrus
(SMG). The MNI coordinates can be found below the labels of the ROIs in Figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016202.g003
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brain areas was similar to their activation on the Control task. The
only other area that was affected by expertise was the left SMG,
which was more engaged among experts than among novices in
the Check task. The left SMG was also the only area that was
significantly more responsive in the Check than Identity task,
presumably indicating its relevance in retrieval of object functions
and establishing relations between objects [2–3].
Relation Between Behavioral, Eye Movement and
Neuroimagining Measures
In this study, we were interested in the differences between
experts and novices and designed a task that captured these
differences on behavioral, eye movement, and neural levels. We
consider all three levels as indicators of the same underpinning
mechanism responsible for superior recognition of objects and
their relations among experts (for a discussion and justification of
this view, see [36,41]). However, it is justified to question whether
the differences at the neural level are a pure reflection of expertise
the way they are at the behavioral and eye movement level (see
[36] for a review). More specifically, neuroimagining results could
be confounded by the differences in reaction time, eye movements,
and task difficulty. We believe such confounds are unlikely for the
following reasons. First, as mentioned in the method section,
controlling for reaction time did not produce a different pattern of
results in the fMRI analysis. Second, the number of eye
movements per se cannot account for neural differences because
an additional, second control task that required more eye
movements than any other task, did not significantly differ in
the level of activation from the control task presented here (see File
S1). Third, the second control task was also more difficult than the
chess tasks as indicated by reaction time (see File S1). And yet,
activation levels in the expertise modulated areas were smaller
than in the chess specific tasks.
Discussion
We demonstrated the influence of experience related knowledge
on the recognition of objects and their relations at behavioral and
neural levels. Expert chess players were faster on the chess-related
tasks than novice players. The eye movement analysis showed that
experts’ greater knowledge about chess specific objects and their
functions enabled them to recognize chess objects and relations
Figure 4. Neuroimagining data summary. Presents the object specific network based on the three comparisons in Figure 3. Orange color
indicates the areas activated in both Identity vs Control, and Check vs Control task comparisons (both separately, not conjunction analsysis); Red
indicates the areas activated only in the Check vs Control task (FUNCTION is in capital letters to emphasize that this area explicitly involves function of
objects, unlike the areas in orange); Yellow indicates the region significantly activated in the Check vs Identity. Please note the colours are transparent
and on the surface of the brain image may look slightly different. The areas modulated by expertise have additional black stripes. In each of these
areas the regions of interests (ROI) were taken by selecting the voxels within 3 mm
3 of the peak activation (see MNI coordinates below the ROI
labels). The activation levels (percent signal change relative to baseline) were extracted for each individual player and averaged across groups and
tasks for the first run only (similar results were obtained when all runs were used).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016202.g004
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the objects. In contrast, novices required more fixations in general
with a higher proportion of direct fixations. Novices were
consequently slower in recognizing chess objects and their
functions. Experts’ advantage was chess specific as it disappeared
on the control task featuring neutral geometric shapes. The
neuroimaging data related the chess specific object recognition to
the bilateral areas of the dorsal stream in the lateral temporal and
parietal lobes.
Our results underline the importance of experience and
knowledge on object recognition. Novices were competent players
and had no difficulties in distinguishing between different chess
pieces as indicated by a small number of errors (see File S1) and
rather fast reaction times (Figure 1C–D). And yet, novices were
clearly slower than experts at arguably basic chess object
recognition tasks. The difference was particularly pronounced in
the Check task when players, in addition to identifying the chess
object itself, had to retrieve its function and relate it to another
chess object. The behavioral results are in line with previous
behavioral chess studies [31–32,42].
Neural Basis of Skilled Object Recognition
The neuroimaging data provide additional confirmation of
functional importance in object recognition. Chess specific object
recognition was associated exclusively with the action related dorsal
visual stream. Both temporal and parietal lateral areas of the dorsal
stream were associated with chess specific recognition of objects and
their relations (see Figure 4). As previously mentioned, the left
temporo-lateral areas have been found to be associated with object
recognition in numerous studies (for reviews, see [2–3,43]). Further,
evidence that left temporo-lateral areas play an essential role is
provided by patient studies. The impairments in these areas are
accompanied with the inability to recognize and/or manipulate
objects [44–45]. Our results show that chess specific object
recognition is also tied to the same areas, thus providing a further
generalization to a new kind of man-made objects. The bilateral
parietal areas (SMG) were also related to object recognition, in
particular to retrieval of object function and recognition of relations
between two objects as required in the Check task (see Figure 4).
These parietal areas are important in action related processing as
evident by their activation when participants retrieve and/or
execute actions [3,12–15], or when participants passively observe
the action of man-made objects [46].
The activation in both temporal and parietal lateral areas was
more pronounced in the Check task, which required action-related
retrieval of function, than in the Identity task, which required only
object recognition (see Figure 4). None of these regions, however,
were significantly more activated when the Check task was directly
compared with the Identity task (see Figure 3C, left panel). These
results should be considered carefully in the light of this study. On
the one hand, the absence of brain areas that distinguish between
the Check and Identity tasks may be taken as further evidence that
the recognition of object is inextricably and automatically coupled
with their functions. On the other hand, it is possible that our
experimental design did not have enough power to detect such,
presumably small, effects. Finally, the left SMG showed a
significant modulation by expertise indicating that parietal regions
may be more specialized for functional properties of objects in
experts.
Right Hemisphere Involvement in Skilled Object
Recognition
The left temporo-lateral areas were engaged by both experts
and novices to a similar extent. The homologous right brain
temporo-lateral areas were, however, also activated in chess
specific object recognition. Moreover, these right areas distin-
guished between experts and novices, unlike their homologous left
counterparts. The right temporo-lateral areas also did not seem to
be of much use for novices as evidenced by the similar activation
levels on the chess specific and the control tasks.
Differences in spatial attention can hardly account for the
expertise effects. Although effects of spatial attention are generally
right lateralized, they engage different areas in the temporal and
parietal lobe [47,48]. The right temporo-parietal junction,
associated with switching of attentional focus [47] is located
superior to the expertise related temporal areas and inferior to the
SMG. Similarly, other regions thought to be involved in spatial
attention, such as superior parietal lobe (SPL), intraparietal sulcus
(IPS), and precuneus [47], were not related to expertise effects –
even in a less stringent whole brain analysis.
It is also difficult to directly relate the differences in the patterns
of fixation to the expertise-related activation differences in right
lateral brain areas. The stimuli were centrally presented and the
distance between the starting fixation at the center of the board
and the objects of interest was less than 2u. If a kind of parafoveal
or peripheral vision was at play, the differences between experts
and novices were not observed in brain areas that are commonly
related to peripheral vision, such as medial areas of the inferior
temporal lobe [49]. A less stringent whole brain analysis did not
reveal expertise-related activation differences in these medial areas
of the inferior temporal lobe.
Most likely the patterns of fixations and the engagement of the
right lateral brain areas in expert chess specific recognition are
related to the same underlying cause – the chess specific
knowledge. Experts have developed knowledge structures through
extensive exposure to chess stimuli [28,50–55]. These sophisticat-
ed knowledge structures not only involve information about types
and location of chess objects [28,50–51], but also about the
relations between these objects through objects’ function [55].
When presented with two or more chess objects, knowledge
structures enable experts to automatically and in parallel retrieve
functions of chess objects and thus rapidly examine if the objects
are in (check) relations [39,56–58]. Novices do not possess
extensively developed knowledge structures and, although they
are familiar with chess objects and their functions, the retrieval of
functions and relations between pieces probably takes place in a
serial nature and thus considerably slower [31–32,39,56–58].
The question remains why the right temporo-lateral brain areas
are associated with skilled object recognition. One possible
explanation would be the holistic processing of stimuli which is
generally more related to the right hemisphere than to the left one
[59–60]. Right hemisphere, for example, processes more global
aspects of a visual stimulus, while left hemisphere is better in
processing local aspects [61–63]. The skilled recognition of chess
objects and their function, however, also involved the left
hemisphere. Although there were some differences between the
activation levels in right and left hemispheres among experts, the
activations in both hemispheres were clearly above the baseline
(see Figure 4). It is thus possible that in experts both hemispheres
may work together to enable automatic and parallel processing
and thus superior domain specific object recognition. The
engagement of both hemispheres to meet additional task demands
is well researched in attention and working memory [64–65].
Simple tasks may require only single hemisphere regions, but more
demanding complex tasks additionally engage homologous areas
in the other hemisphere [66]. Similarly, experiments on visual
laterality show that lateralized processing is sufficient in simple
tasks, but more complex tasks are solved better when both
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to the communication between hemispheres is offset by the
benefits of the processing in both hemispheres [66].
The exact mechanisms of the inter-hemispheric communication
are less clear. They could involve, for example, parallel
independent processing as well as highly dependent processing
through inter-hemispheric interaction [66,69–70]. These mecha-
nisms could increase the processing power by allocating different
computations involved in the task to different hemispheres.
Theinter-hemisphericinteractionoffersaplausibleexplanationfor
the bilateral activations in chess experts. Although the tasks in our
study were relatively simple and seemingly required little effort, the
eye movements showed that experts used a different processing
strategy than novices. Experts’ strategy is arguably more difficult and
only possible because of the extensive chess specific knowledge. The
well-known parallel and automatic processing among experts [39,56]
may require additionalbrain resources for successful execution. Inthe
case of skilled chess specific object recognition these additional
computational resources are located in the homologous right
temporal and parietal areas. The nature of our design makes it
difficult to connect each hemisphere and their specific temporal and
parietal areas to specific processes that are required for the chess
specific recognition (e.g., recognizing an object, its function, and
relating it to a different object). A promising approach could be a
more direct manipulation of involved brain regions by excitation or
inhibition through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS).
The finding that experts’ object processing is supported by
additional homologous brain structures, however, may indicate that
there are qualitative differences in skilled and non-skilled chess
object recognition. The involvement of both hemispheres is also
found in other paradigms in the same domain [23,71]. It is also in
line with observations in other domains that skilled processing
qualitatively differs from novices’ processing. Experts in mental
calculations, for example, also additionally engage homologous
brain areas in comparison to novice mental calculators when
presented with a demanding task [72]. Thus, experts, supported by
their knowledge base, are able to employ more sophisticated and
efficient processing strategies when necessary. This reasoning
corresponds with numerous behavioral and eye movement studies
that demonstrate the qualitative differences between experts’ and
novices’ cognitive processing [39,73]. The present study suggests
that the qualitative nature of different processing strategies is also
reflected in different patterns of brain activations.
Conclusion
Our expertise approach combined with concurrent application
of behavioral and neuroimaging techniques enabled us to uncover
cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying skilled object
recognition. We showed that skilled recognition is not solely based
on more efficient versions of the same cognitive processes
necessary in non-skilled recognition. Instead, skilled recognition
may involve qualitatively different cognitive processes which are
accommodated in the human brain through engagement of
additional homologous brain areas. This finding is important
because it may reflect a general characteristic of expertise. It also
underlines the importance of investigating the cognitive processes
in experts because many of them may not reflect only a more
efficient version of the processes we normally find in lay-people.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eight expertchess players(mean age6 standard deviation,2967
years) and eight novice chess players (2965) participated in the
experiment. The size of the expert sample corresponds to the expert
samples used in behavioral research on expertise [31,38,74–76] and
is largerthan the few neuroimaginingstudies involvingchess experts
[71,77–78]. Most importantly, our experts were exceptionally
skilled practitioners. Players get rated based on their performance
against other rated players. The international chess Elo scale is an
interval scale with a theoretical mean of 1500 and standard
deviation of 200 [79]. Experts are players with a rating of 2000 Elo
points or more. Our experts were highly rated – on average 2130
(+/2147) points– and werethus highly skilled chess players. Novice
players were hobby players who played chess occasionally. Their
chessskillswereclearlyinferiortoexpertsbuttheyhad nodifficulties
in identifying chess pieces and their functions (these aspects are the
absolute basics of the chess game). The novices would easily beat
beginners who usually struggle to relate chess objects to their typical
function. All players were male and right-handed. The Institutional
Review Board of the Ethic Committee of Tu ¨bingen University
approved this study and written informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Tasks and Stimuli
Each player performed three tasks. In the first Control task
players had to indicate if the stimulus presented was a diamond or
a square by pressing the left or right button, respectively (see File
S1). In the Identity task, players had to identify if the presented
black chess piece was a rook or a knight (by pressing the left or
right button, respectively). In the Check task, players were
provided with the same stimuli as in the Identity task, but now
they had to indicate if the black chess piece was giving check to the
white king (left for check and right for no check). Stimuli were an
artificial 363 chess board with two chess pieces. In the Control
task, a grey circle was always presented in the upper left corner
that was irrelevant for the task and was presented to keep the
visual complexity of the stimuli similar to the Check task. An
additional object, a grey square or diamond, was presented at the
upper right location or the lower middle location (see Figure 1A).
In the Identity task, the geometrical shapes were replaced by a
black knight or rook while the circle was replaced by a white king.
The white king had no function in this task and was presented to
ensure visual compatibility between this and the Check task. The
knight and rook appeared at the same two locations as the
geometrical shapes – upper right and lower middle location. The
Check task involved the same stimuli as the Identity task (king
always at the upper left location and knight or rook variably at
upper right or lower middle location). The king now had to be
taken into account to solve the task successfully.
There was an additional Control task (Control 2) that we
present in File S1. This Control task had the same geometrical
shapes for the stimuli as the other Control task, but required taking
into account two features, location and shape, for successful
execution. Players had to indicate whether there was a circle on a
grey location or a square on a white location (one response
category) or whether there was a circle on a white location or a
square on a grey location (the alternative response category). The
task was used to additionally control for attention and eye
movements (see File S1).
The dimension of the whole stimulus was 1506150 pixels, while
the dimension of a single square was 50650 pixels. The stimuli
were projected onto a screen above the head of the players via a
video projector in the adjacent room. Players saw the stimuli
through a mirror mounted on the head coil (see File S1). The
physical dimensions of the stimulus were 126 mm for the whole
stimulus and 42 mm for the single square. The setup resulted in a
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square on the board.
Design and Procedure
The tasks were performed in blocks consisting of four trials with
thesame task.Ina singlerun therewere16blocks, fourforeachtask
(including the additional control task – see File S1). There were four
runs. The order of blocks within a run was randomized and
counterbalanced over players. Each block started with an empty
363 board that acted as a baseline (see Figure 1B). The baseline of
13.5 s was followed by an instruction screen of 3 s indicating the
task. After the instruction, there was a break for 1 sec in which an
empty 363 board was presented. Then a black cross appeared in
the 363 board. Players were asked to fixate the cross. The cross
lasted for 0.5 s and was used to inform players about the upcoming
stimulus. The trial stimulus was then presented for maximum of 2 s.
Players were allowed to move their eyes during the trial. The trial
stimulus immediately disappeared after the response was given and
was replaced by a break which filled the reminding two seconds
(e.g., if the response was given after 0.5 s, the break lasted for 1.5 s).
After the trial stimulus (and the break), the 1 second-break and the
fixation cross were again presented (to enable a break between the
trials and as a warning for the next stimulus, respectively). Each
block contained 4 trials and blocks were separated by the baseline
and the instruction. Response times were measured from stimulus
onset until onset of the key press. In all tasks, players indicated their
decision by pressing one of two buttons of an MRI-compatible
response device held in the right hand (the left button was for
diamond, rook, or check, depending on the task, and the right
button for square, knight, no check). All players first read the
instruction and were presented in advance with a practice block for
each task outside of the scanner. Before the actual session, players
practiced each task for two blocks.
Eye-Movement Data Acquisition
Players’ eye movements were recorded by an infra-red remote
long-range eye-tracking device (iView X MEyeTrack Long Range,
SMI) sampling at 50 Hz. The device is MRI-compatible and did
notinterferewithplayers’performance(seeFileS1).Thesystemhad
anerrorof0.5–1u,correspondingto8.6–17.1 mm(thatislessthan a
third of a square) on the board. We used a nine-point calibration
with bi-quadratic functions before each run. We created a program
in MatLab 7.1 to analyze the eye movement data of four experts
and seven novices (technical problems prevented eye movement
measurementinthe otherplayers).Wedefineda fixationasanevent
where players kept their eyes within a diameter of 25 pixels for
80 ms or more. Using a larger diameter to define a fixation did not
markedly influence the results presented here and in File S1. We
extracted the fixations for each player on each stimulus in each task.
These fixations were then averaged across stimuli, tasks, and groups
(see File S1). In order to investigate the pattern of fixations, we
calculated the percentage of fixation that fell within a square where
an object of interest was placed. In the Control and Identity tasks,
the square of interest was always the square where the geometrical
shape or chess piece was located; while in the Check task it was
alwaystwosquares– thatofthechessobjectandthe constantsquare
of the king (upper right).
Behavioral and Eye Movement Analysis
Since we were interested in differences between the individual
tasks, we compared performance in the Identity task and the
Control task using a 2 (task – Control/Identity) 62 (expertise –
Experts-Novices) ANOVA. Two 262 ANOVAs were computed to
compare Check – Control tasks, and Check – Identity tasks.
Because we weremainlyinterested inthedifferencebetweenexperts
and novices in all the tasks separately, we further computed t-tests
for independent samples, separately for all three tasks.
Imaging Data Acquisition
We acquired fMRI data using a 3 T scanner (Siemens Trio)
with a 12-channel head coil at the fMRI center in Tu ¨bingen,
Germany. We covered the whole brain using a standard echo-
planar-imaging sequence with the following parameters:
[TR]=2.5 s; [FOV]=1926192; [ET]=35 ms; matrix size =
64664, 36 slices with thickness of 3.2 mm+0.8 mm gap resulting
in voxels with the resolution of 36364m m
3. Anatomical images
covering whole brain with 176 sagittal slices were obtained after
the functional runs using an MP-RAGE sequence with a voxel
resolution of 16161m m
3 (TR=2.3 s, TI=1.1 s, TE=2.92 ms).
Functional MRI Data Analysis
The preprocessing was done with SPM5 and involved spatial
realignment to the mean image including unwarping, co-
registration of the anatomical image to the mean EPI, unified
segmentation procedure, normalization to the MNI-brain tem-
plate and a 8-mm FWHM spatial smoothing. We modelled the
blocks for each tasks in each run together with the instruction
explicitly while the baseline was implicitly modelled in a general
linear model (hemodynamic activation modelling relied upon a
canonical response function, AR(1) and a 128 Hz high-pass filter).
The fMRI analyses equalled the analysis of behavioral and eye
movement data. First, we compared Identity with Control task
filling the parameters (con images) of the individual analysis of
each player in a 262 ANOVA. The results of the main effects and
their interaction were examined at a significance level at p,.05
(FWE; corrected for multiple comparisons; 5 or more contiguous
voxels). Further 262 ANOVAs were computed to compare Check
and Control tasks, and Check and Identity tasks. The results are
presented in Figure 3 using Surfrend Toolbox in SPM5 and
FreeSurfer. Including the average RT of each player as covariate
at the second level, as a way of controlling for the influence of
reaction time on BOLD signal, produced the similar pattern of
results as presented in Figure 3.
For illustrative and descriptive purposes, we used the MarsBaR
SPM Toolbox (Marseille ROI toolbox, Version .041) to extract the
signal percent change relative to baseline in each task in the first run
for each participant (see [40]). Since the significant regions were close
to each other, we used a 3 mm
3 sphere around the most activated
voxel as regions of interest (ROIs) for each of the significant areas (see
Figure3inthemaintext).Thedescriptiveresultsfromthefirstrun(all
runs produce a similar pattern of results) are presented in Figure 4
together with a summary of the fMRI analyses. Using all runs did not
change the pattern of activation levels.
Supporting Information
File S1 Additional data, analysis, and seven figures.
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